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OF TRUSTS, HUMAN DIGNITY, LEGAL
SCIENCE, AND TAXES
SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR A LOUISIANA
TRUST ESTATES LAW
Robert A. Pascal*
T he legislature of the State of Louisiana has directed that a
revision of the Trust Estates Law be prepared for its con-
sideration.' In this article the writer shall express his recom-
mendations and the reasons which underlie them. The observa-
tions to be made fall into three categories: the substance of the
trust and the uses to which it should - and should not - be put;
its form or technical structure; and its tax consequences.
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TRUST
What Is an Express Private Trust?
The present Trust Estates Law2 declares an express private
trust is created when one person (the settlor) transfers legal
title to property to another (the trustee) for his own benefit or
that of a third person (the beneficiary).s This statement con-
forms to both the historical origin and the present technical for-
mulation of the express private trust in Anglo-American law.
Functionally, however, as the writer has elsewhere explained,4
the express private trust is a property regime, a dismemberment
of ownership, in which control and management are separated
from beneficial right. 5 Only the person who is at the time owner
of the property or patrimonial right may create the trust. He
may do so for his own benefit, transferring only the power of
control and management to the trustee and retaining the bene-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Consultant, Louisiana State
Law Institute, Trust Estates Law Revision Project, September 1959-March 1963.
Previous articles by the same writer on trusts in Louisiana are: Some ABC's
About Trusts and Us, 13 LA. L. REV. 555 (1953), and The Trust Concept and
Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273 (1959).
1. The Louisiana State Law Institute received an initial appropriation for
this work in 1958. See the ELEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE (May 8, 1960).
2. LA. R.S. 9:1791-2212 (1950).
3. Id. 9:1811, as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 209, § 2.
4. Especially in The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273,
274-76 (1959).
5. See LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF' PROPERTY 9, 10, 77 (1958).
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ficial rights.in the property; or he may create the trust for the
benefit of others, transferring to them the beneficial rights in
the property subject to its control and management by the
trustee.0 It is a fiduciary institution pure and simple. The
trustee in principle never has a beneficial interest in the prop-
erty interest over which he has management and control. He is
not a mandatary, nevertheless, for his authority and duties are
dictated by the settlor within broad limits imposed by law, and
not by the person who is to have the beneficial interest in the
property subject to the trust.
Is the Express Private Trust Consistent With the Rest of
Louisiana Property Law?
To this question the answer must be that it is not. Under-
stood and defined functionally rather than in technical Anglo-
American terms, the express private trust can be fitted into Lou-
isiana law without formal difficulty ;7 but the separation of con-
trol and interest, which is of the essence of the private trust, is
very little favored; and when it is permitted it is always by the
body social acting through general laws prescribing both the
occasion and the form ;s never otherwise than in express private
trusts is one individual allowed to deprive another individual of
control of his property and dictate the rules of its administra-
tion.9
Basic Louisiana property law seeks to give to the owner max-
imum control over his patrimony. This is the spirit and prin-
ciple implicit in our law which provides for management or con-
trol of one's property by another only through law or through
6. Anglo-American law, but not Louisiana law, recognizes a third manner in
which a trust may be created: the settlor may declare himself trustee of his prop-
erty for another, thus transferring beneficial interests and retaining control as a
fiduciary for the beneficiary.
7. See especially The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273
(1959), in which this is demonstrated in connection with the supposed, but in
fact unjustified, antagonism between trusts and the prohibition against substi-
tutions.
8. Paternal authority, tutorship, curatorship of interdicts, administration of
successions by administrators and executors are the most common examples. The
phenomenon of separation of control from interest is also present in the business
corporation, but here the question is avoided legally by treating the stock share,
rather than what it represents, as the object of ownership.
9. An apparent, but unreal, exception is the custodianship of money or securi-
ties donated to minors under the Gifts to Minors Law, LA. R.S. 9:735-742 (Supp.
1962), added by La. Acts 1958, No. 195, § 1. This institution, however, is really
a trust defined in modern terms, the minor being the beneficiary owner and the
custodian the administrator of the property. Again, see The Trust Concept and
Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1959).
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his consent and makes mandate essentially revocable. This is the
basis of the general rule that an owner in indivision may always
demand a partition. This is the spirit and principle of the pro-
hibition against substitutions, for he who must preserve prop-
erty for another is denied the powers of disposition and free use
which belong to an owner. Nevertheless it is true that this prin-
ciple is not applied as an absolute. It is made to give way to
more important considerations under certain circumstances.
Obviously the property of minors and mental deficients must
be placed under the authority of others. Control over an in-
solvent's assets may be denied him and given to syndics or trus-
tees to insure the orderly discharge of his obligations to his
creditors. Through the fiction of the corporate personality, or
perhaps more accurately, by recognizing a stock share as a thing
rather than a right to things, a group of non-owners may be
given very substantial control and management of the stock-
holders' property and the individual stockholder denied the usual
right to partition. Partition may be denied to heirs for a limited
time, and it is always denied to usufructuaries as against the
naked owners and vice versa. A mandate may be regarded as
irrevocable if used as a security device. Indeed, even a substitu-
tion will be permitted for not longer than a lifetime, though it
will then be regarded not as a substitution but as a dismember-
ment of ownership into naked ownership and either usufruct,
use, or habitation. 10 The question whether the trust is to be tol-
erated, then, is not to be answered simply by observing that the
trust qua trust seems contrary to the basic principle that the
owner should have control over his property. Rather is the ques-
tion to be answered in terms of the advantages and disadvan-
tages incident to permitting this departure from the accepted
basic principle and the manner in which it may be created. And
this question, in turn, must be answered in the light of the legit-
imacy of the uses to which the device will be put.
Are There Advantages To Permitting Private
Express Trusts?
Again an unequivocal answer can be given. Yes, there are
reasons for which a trust might be used very legitimately, and
10. LA. CIviL CODE art. 1522 (1870). It is interesting to note that Bracton
regarded the life estate -remainder disposition, which corresponds roughly to
our usufruct-naked ownership arrangement, as a substitution. See PLUCK-
NETT, A CoNCIsE HIsTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 560-61 (5th ed. 1956).
1963]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
therefore there is good reason to have a trust law in Louisiana.
Some good uses of the trust may be mentioned. First of all the
trust often may be a better solution than the ordinary usufruct-
naked ownership arrangement where the purpose to be achieved
is a present utilization of property by one person and its subse-
quent full enjoyment by another. Without the trust the naked
owner often finds himself prejudiced by the usufructuary's in-
adequate management or upkeep of the tangible property or his
inability to return the money which he enjoyed in imperfect
usufruct. The naked owner's lot is especially difficult if the usu-
fructuary has not been required to give security, or if the usu-
fructuary or his representatives be persons against whom he
would be reluctant to enforce his right for family or other con-
siderations. If the property were in trust, and the beneficiaries
entitled either to the usufruct and naked ownership or to the
income and principal thereof subject to the trust, the naked own-
er or principal beneficiary might be better protected by the
trustee's lack of personal interest and his obligation to preserve
and to augment the value of the property for the eventual bene-
ficiary as well as to make it productive for the income or usu-
fruct beneficiary.
What is said here concerning the advantage of trusts in in-
stances of usufruct-naked ownership dispositions applies with
equal, if not more, force to dispositions on suspensive or resolu-
tory conditions or on terms. Such dispositions are relatively rare
in Louisiana, but perhaps they are rare precisely because they
are inconvenient to the owner pending their eventual outcome,
and the trust would minimize this inconvenience.
Again, ordinarily property owned in terms of usufruct and
naked ownership cannot be converted to other forms of assets
or investments without the cooperation of both parties. Neither
the usufructuary nor the naked owner may compel the other to
consent to a conversion of assets. When property is in trust, on
the other hand, the trustee can be given the power and ordinarily
has the duty to convert the trust assets into property of a kind
which will best protect the interests of the several beneficiaries.
In the same connection it may be observed that the trust also
makes practicable the avoidance of one of the consequences of
imperfect usufruct, namely, the realization of all capital gains
by the party presently entitled rather than by the party eventual-
ly entitled. To say the same thing in other words, whereas the
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imperfect usufructuary benefits from capital gains, and not the
naked owner, in a trust with income and principal beneficiaries,
the capital gains belong to the principal beneficiary and not to
the income beneficiary. To change the rules of imperfect usu-
fruct to give the naked owner the same advantage would be pos-
sible in theory, but impossible in practice. In order to avoid
otherwise insurmountable tracing problems it would be neces-
sary to make the imperfect usufructuary a fiduciary of the na-
ked owner; and this would render his position almost indistin-
guishable from that of a fideicommissarius. The trust device
simplifies the whole matter by putting the fiduciary onus on a
third disinterested party, the trustee. Of course, it is not sug-
gested that usufruct-naked ownership interests should not be
given subject to trusts; indeed trusts with usufruct-naked owner-
ship beneficiaries have been and are yet being written in Louisi-
ana. Much less so is it suggested that usufruct-naked ownership
arrangements outside of trust, including imperfect usufruct,
should be forbidden. There are times and circumstances in
which only one of several possible arrangements may be satis-
factory, not any one of them, and all should be permitted.
Another important use of the trust would be to facilitate a
simpler and more unified management of property to be trans-
ferred to minors or interdicts and persons of full capacity as
owners in indivision. Without the trust the only solution, and
often a less satisfactory one, would be through incorporation.
The trust can also be used wisely to provide a management
of property for minors and interdicts where it appears likely
either that the prospective tutors or curators would be insuffi-
ciently capable, or that the rules on administration of property
by tutors and curators would be too restrictive, to assure the
best employment of the property. In this connection, however,
the trust is no longer so much in need. Recent changes in the
law of tutorship and curatorship, especially on investments by
the tutor or curator,' do much to make the use of trusts for the
benefit of incapables unnecessary. Each situation must receive
separate appraisal.
Not to be ignored is the possibility of providing a regime of
property management for persons who may not in fact have the
aptitude for such. Widows and children are the age-old ex-
11. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 4269, 4554 (1960) require the tutor
and curator to adhere to the "prudent investor rule."
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amples. Yet, as shall be developed below, it would be a crime
against the dignity of man to permit such a trust to be intermi-
nable by the beneficiary or, in any event, to remain indestruc-
tible too long. A trust for this purpose should be regarded as a
suggested plan of investment and management, to be rejected by
the beneficiary, the actual party at interest, if he or she prefers.
Most significantly, the trust could be, and should be, used to
make possible dispositions in favor of unborn persons, at least
in instances in which there is a social and familial need for them.
Present law, for example, makes it impossible for a person to
make a legacy to grandchildren born and to be born. Anglo-
American experience testifies to the troublesomeness of such do-
nations unless made in trust. In trust, however, they cause no
difficulty, for the income from the property can be paid to the
grandchildren existing at any time and the final determination
of the shares in the principal can be made to await the day on
which the total number of grandchildren is ascertainable.
Similarly, but for somewhat different reasons, an inter vivos
disposition to one's children born and to be born could and should
be permitted if in trust. Gift and estate tax laws encourage a
person to dispose of his property gradually during life rather
than on death. The reason is a social one, the encouragement of
the distribution of wealth. Yet outright donations to living chil-
dren, for example, often would work to the prejudice of those
later born or, in Louiisana, give rise to incidents for collation to
satisfy the legitime of the later born children. By placing the
donations inter vivos in trust for the children born and to be
born the donor can satisfy his legitimate desire to treat all chil-
dren equally, and incidentally avoid collation problems. Possibly
it would be unwise, at least at this moment, considering Louisi-
ana law's long prohibition against dispositions to the unborn, to
permit more than these two particular kinds of class gifts; but
at least these two should be permitted now.
What Abuses Ought To Be Avoided?
Primary Abuses: Indestructibility and Indivisibility.-From
the preceding section it is evident that the separation of control
and interest which the trust'device affords can at times be of
great utility and practical advantage. Yet this separation of con-
trol and interest can be abusive. In the opinion of the writer it
is abusive in principle whenever the beneficiary may not termi-
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nate the trust and take personal charge of the property of which
he has the beneficial interest. In short, the trust established for
the benefit of another than the settlor should be regarded as the
establishment of an investment and management program for
the property transferred to the beneficiary, which program the
beneficiary may reject or modify as he chooses; and the trust
established by the settlor for his own benefit should always be
subject to modification or termination by him.
The general American law on trust is to the contrary, and so
is the present Louisiana Trust Estates Law. Under the general-
ly accepted American rule and under the Louisiana Trust Es-
tates Law a trust is indestructible by the beneficiary unless the
settlor has given him the power to terminate it ;12 and under the
Louisiana Trust Estates Law, though not under the rule gen-
erally prevailing in America, unless the trust instrument so pro-
vides, the trust cannot be terminated "even though the settlor,
trustee, and beneficiary" -the only parties possibly at interest
- "so desire and consent thereto."'13 Such rules, the writer sub-
mits, are abusive because they violate the dignity of the human
person. Men have reason and free will. It is proper to the na-
ture of the human person, therefore, that he should be allowed
to decide for himself how he should live, and this living includes
the use of wealth properly appropriated by or transferred to him
for his use and benefit.14
12. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 337 (1939) ; LA. R.S. 9:2176 (1950).
13. In American law the trust can be terminated if the settlor and all bene-
ficiaries consent. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 338 (1939). Contra in Louisiana unless the
trust instrument so provides. LA. R.S. 9:2176 (1950).
14. See, for example, JOHN XXIII, Encyclical PACEM IN TERRIS (PEACE ON
EARTH) issued April 11, 1963. The following excerpts are taken from Part I,
Order between Men:
"First of all, it is necessary to speak of the order which should exist between
men. Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay
down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person,
that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. By virtue of this,
he has rights and duties of his own, flowing directly and simultaneously from his
very nature, which are therefore universal, inviolable and inalienable.
"Human beings have the natural right to free initiative in the economic field,
and the right to work.
"The right to private property, even of productive goods, also derives from
the nature of man. This right, as we have elsewhere declared, is a suitable means
for safeguarding the dignity of the human person and for the exercise of respon-
sibility in all fields; it strengthens and gives serenity to family life, thereby in-
creasing the peace and prosperity of the state.
"The dignity of the human person also requires that every man enjoy the
right to act freely and responsibly. For this reason, therefore, in social relationi
man should exercise his rights, fulfill his obligations; and, in the countless forms
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It is true, nevertheless, that application of any principle of
action should be restricted to the sphere indicated by its basis
and further limited so that due respect can be given other prin-
ciples of action. The principle of self-determination being based
on man's reason and free will, it is not applicable to persons in
the degree in which they lack freedom of will or the full matur-
ity of judgment. This consideration justifies denying minors
and other incompetents authority to deal with their property
and placing it under the control of parents, tutors, and curators;
so too can it be justification for denying the minor or person of
unsound mind the right to terminate a trust in his favor.
Yet this is not the end of the affair for the trust in favor of
incapables. Though incapables may be denied some or all the
control over property ordinarily given individuals possessing
mature judgment and will, it is one thing to deny them that con-
trol according to a plan applicable to all in like situations ac-
cording to general laws and another thing to permit the admin-
istration of their affairs to be dictated, as it may be through
trusts, by other individuals. This gives too much authority to
individuals over other individuals. Reason and free will give
rise to a right to self-determination,15 not to a right to determine
the affairs of others. The denial to men of their fundamental
rights, even for their own good, as in the case of incapables,
should be possible normally only through action according to law,
for it is the responsibility of government, not of individual men,
to provide for the common good and the regulation of the affairs
of those incapable of caring for themselves. Applied to trusts in
favor of incapables, the indication is that a trust scheme of man-
agement must not be allowed to interfere with the proper man-
agement of the incapable's affairs by his legal representative.
Therefore the legal representative should have authority to de-
mand that a trust be modified or terminated for the good of the
incapable. Of course, the incapable's representative might be
made to prove that the interests of the incapable require modifi-
of collaboration with others, act chiefly on his own responsibility and initiative.
"This is to be done in such a way that each one acts on his own decision, of
set purpose and from a consciousness of his obligation, without being moved by
force or pressure brought to bear on him externally. For any human society that
is established on relations of force must be regarded as inhuman, inasmuch as the
personality of its members is repressed or restricted, when in fact they should be
provided with appropriate incentives and means for developing and perfecting
themselves."
Those who prefer a more secularly oriented source may be referred to JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1689).
15. Ibid.
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cation or termination of the trust before he be permitted to take
such action, just as he must make such proof before selling or
mortgaging an immovable of the incapable or compromising
his claims.
What has been said above concerning termination of trusts
by beneficiaries applies with equal force to partial termination
and even to partition of the trust where the property in trust is
partitionable. Thus, to give a simple example, if there are two
beneficiaries, each of whom has a fractional interest as benefi-
ciary of income as well as of principal, and the trust property
is partitionable, either should be allowed to demand the parti-
tion of the trust into two trusts, or to terminate the trust as to
his fractional interest. If, for any reason, however, partition
or partial termination would prejudice the other seriously, as
might be the case, for example, if one is income beneficiary and
the other principal beneficiary, then the partition or partial
termination should not be allowed except by mutual consent, for
this in itself would be forcing one beneficiary to abide by the
will of another. This will be discussed further below.
The settlor who creates a trust for his own benefit cannot
be said to suffer the indignity of having to accept a property
management scheme imposed on him by another. Nevertheless
the trust which he establishes in his favor must be subject to his
modification or termination at all times, for the right to use
one's mind and will to work out one's life must itself be regard-
ed as inalienable. 16 One may, and often must, limit his freedom
to the extent necessary to achieve the kind of cooperation which
life in society demands; but he may not ethically limit his own
freedom without social need. A law which permits him to do so
is as morally wrong as that which permits another to impose his
will on him.
There are, nevertheless, instances in which the principle of
self-determination, though applicable, must be applied in such a
manner as to give a due respect for the application of other prin-
ciples as well. Thus it is that there are instances in which the
sphere of application of the principle should be reduced. By way
of example, an income or usufruct beneficiary in trust should
not be allowed to demand a termination of the trust against the




vice versa. If the income and naked ownership beneficiaries
could demand the trust's termination by unilateral act, the prin-
cipal and usufruct beneficiaries would be compelled to assume
fiduciary responsibilities toward the others. Similarly, if the
usufruct and principal beneficiaries could demand termination
of the trust, the naked ownership and income beneficiaries would
be obliged to accept an administration of the property by the
former. In any of these four situations the principle of self-
determination would be violated by permitting termination of
the trust.
Similarly, if class dispositions are to be permitted, it may be
better normally - though not necessarily always17 - to forbid
termination even with the consent of all living beneficiaries
until all beneficiaries are ascertained. The living always being
the greatest concern of the law, should the good of all or any of
the living beneficiaries stand to suffer more from the continu-
ance of the trust than the others would from its termination,
then termination should be permitted. Of course, where termi-
nation is to be allowed, partition should be allowed where prac-
ticable, as mentioned before.
If a trust is destructible, it matters not how long it lasts; the
beneficiaries can always put an end to it. But the moral wrong
inherent in the indestructibility of trusts is increased in direct
proportion to the term for which the trust is to last. Under the
Louisiana Trust Estates Law a trust may endure for as long as
any income beneficiary alive at the creation of the trust con-
tinues to live.18 Thus the trust may continue indestructible for
a very long lifetime if one of the beneficiaries is an infant at
the time of its creation. To add insult to injury, the Louisiana
Trust Estates Law also provides that the trust shall last for the
longest period of time allowed by law unless an earlier termina-
tion date is provided in the trust instrument.' 9 Nonetheless,
there is some merit to permitting a settlor to specify indestructi-
bility for a very short time, probably not more than five years.
Often a trust will provide a program of investment and manage-
ment the value of which the beneficiary may not appreciate im-
mediately, and a few years of indestructibility may afford him
time to gain the proper perspective. The opportunity to weigh
17. See the reference to the English Variations of Trusts Act, 1958, at page
652 infra.
18. LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 74, § 1.
19. Ibid.
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the advantages of the trust as created may justify the short
period of indestructibility.
Related But Aggravated Abuses: Trusts Over the Legitime;
Accumulations; Spendthrift Trusts; Duration Beyond
Death of Beneficiaries
If an indestructible trust is morally wrong because it denies
the beneficiary whosoever he be his natural right as a person
to administer his own affairs, then it is even more wrong moral-
ly to permit an indestructible trust over the legitime, or forced
share of an inheritance, to be indestructible. The legitime has
its origin in the recognition of every man's right to a share in
the world's goods which he can use as he judges best. It is espe-
cially reprehensible to permit this share to be unalterably under
the control of another. Yet the present Trust Estates Law20 -
and the Louisiana Constitution 21 - permit this. The new Trust
Estates Law need not forbid the placing of the iegitime in trust;
but under no circumstances should it permit the trust over the
legitime to be indestructible or unmodifiable by the forced heir.
Similarly, if it is morally wrong to permit indestructible
trusts, then it is even more wrong to permit directions for the
accumulation of income contrary to the wishes of the benefi-
ciary. Indeed, whereas the indestructibility of trusts denies to
the beneficiary the possibility of gaining control and manage-
ment of his capital, the accumulation of income denies to him
even its revenues. Under the present Trust Estates Law the
settlor may direct the accumulation of income - except that de-
rived from the legitime in trust -for as long as the trust will
last.22 Thus it is that a beneficiary might be denied the use of
all or a substantial portion of the income from the trust during
his entire life. But the law is not heartless: if the trust is not
of the spendthrift variety he will be able to assign his interest
in the income, and always he will have the right to let it pass to
his heirs by inheritance or to dispose of it by will. Actually in
either case the beneficiary's interest is reduced to a power or
capacity to dispose of it at death, for eventual interests in trusts
20. LA. R.S. 9:1793 (1950), combined with id. 9:1794 (1950), as amended,
La. Acts 1962, No. 74, § 1, and id. 9:2176 (1950).
21. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 521.
22. LA. R.S. 9:2092(c) (1950) permits accumulations. The only limitations
are from the provision as to income derived from the legitime in trust, id. 9:1793,
and from that on the duration of the trust itself, id. 9:1794, as amended, La.
Acts 1962, No. 74, § 1.
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usually are not readily assignable. This is hardly great satisfac-
tion. Through the device of accumulating the income, therefore,
the first generation can be substantially prejudiced to the ad-
vantage of the second. It is no defense to argue that inasmuch
as the income to be accumulated is that on property outside the
legitime, that is to say, property which could have been given
to another, the beneficiary cannot be heard to complain. The
root of the objection is that one is given property but permitted
neither control nor enjoyment of it. In effect, the beneficiary of
income accumulated for life is not a beneficiary at all; he is a
human conduit of an asset, a person in a much worse position
than the fideicommissarius of former times. The latter at least
had substantial control and enjoyment during his lifetime even
though he was obliged to transfer the property to a second donee
at a later date. 28 Again, however, the writer wishes to emphasize
that even a direction for accumulation is not objectionable if the
beneficiary is entitled to terminate it or modify it. The direc-
tion to accumulate is then part of the plan for investment and
employment of the trust funds suggested to the beneficiary but
not forced upon him.
Again, if a trust is objectionable if indestructible by the
beneficiary, it is even more objectionable if the beneficiary can-
not assign or transfer his interest subject to the trust. Yet the
Louisiana Trust Estates Law provides that a settlor may specify
that the beneficiary's interest shall be inalienable by him. 24 In
addition, the settlor may even provide that creditors may not
reach any of the principal of the trust or any more than a cer-
tain portion of the income not to exceed the limits established
by law. 25 This last provision, therefore, not only interferes with
the beneficiary's obligation to discharge his debts, but violates
the principle that the property of a debtor is the common pledge
of his creditors.26
Every indestructible express private trust is to some extent
an interdiction by private act as to the property in trust; but the
spendthrift trust is the extreme form. The argument for spend-
thrift trusts is usually that some persons must be saved from
23. Indeed, he had a right to retain for himself a portion of the property of
which he was fideicommissarius. This was the trebellianic portion mentioned in
Article 1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code as it stood before amendment by La.
Acts 1962, No. 45.
24. LA, R.S. 9:1923 (1950).
25. Ibid.
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3183 (1870).
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their own folly. The answer to that is that men cannot be saved
from their own folly without being subject to the indignity of
a kind of paternalistic solicitation that finds a fair parallel in
so-called beneficial colonialism among nations. The price, a fail-
ure to recognize the right of another to self-determination, is
too high. Yet it is not to be denied that sometimes there are
persons who should be interdicted and are not, and therefore it
would be understandable to allow the settlor to impose a spend-
thrift trust if the beneficiary would then be given the oppor-
tunity to modify the trust on showing he is capable of managing
the property in trust. If the representative of society, and not
the settlor, can make the final decision, then a spendthrift trust
will be tolerable. Thus the spendthrift clause -or clause
against voluntary or involuntary alienation- can be permitted
if a reasonable procedure is established through which the bene-
ficiary - or even his creditors - can demonstrate his capacity
and be allowed to alienate his interest in the trust or to termi-
nate the trust itself. Certainly standards for determining
whether the non-interdicted person should be allowed to sell his
interest in a trust or terminate it can be worked out, and if there
is fear of mistake here great latitude of discretion can be left
to the judge until our experience grows.
Last in the list of abuses which might be mentioned here is
the provision in the Louisiana Trust Estates Law as a result of
which, unless the settlor stipulates the contrary, a trust may en-
dure beyond the lives of all beneficiaries until ten years after the
testator's death.27 The writer fails to see the reason for such a
provision, unless it be to flatter a settlor's vanity by assuring him
this projection of will shall not be totally defeated even if the
beneficiaries are not there to enjoy it, or unless it be to assure
a professional trustee a minimum number of years of fees from
every trusteeship accepted. Certainly amicable trustees would
not want such a provision. If professional trustees need such
economic protection, then the writer suggests that some measure
be taken to insure it, but otherwise than through the device of
continuing the trust without other purpose.
Further Remarks on the Uses and Abuses of
Express Private Trusts
In summary, most of the abuses tolerated under the present
27. LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 74, § 1.
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Trust Estates Law stem from the fact that the beneficiary may
be - and in practice usually is - denied authority to modify,
partition, or terminate the trust. Were the beneficiary given, in
principle at least, the right to modify, partition, or terminate the
trust he would be master of his property, and there could be no
objection of a moral nature.
The indestructibility of express private trusts is an Ameri-
can invention . 2  The English have never tolerated it, and have
always permitted the termination or modification of the trust
by agreement of all beneficiaries sui juris, provided their inter-
ests were absolute. Thus according to Underhill's Law of Trusts
and Trustees, a trust may be terminated
"... even where the settlor has contemplated and intended
that the trustee shall have the control of the property, if the
sole party beneficially interested, or the parties collectively
if there are several of them, are unanimously in favour of
'breaking the trust,' and all are sui juris. For a trust is the
equitable equivalent of a common law gift, and, when once
declared, the settlor, like the donor of a gift, has no further
rights over the property .... ,,29
This rule is applied to successive as well as to simultaneous bene-
ficiaries 0 Just as they may terminate the trust they may modi-
fy it, though they may not compel a trustee to accept new duties
involving an exercise of discretion.3 1 Even a mortgagee of the
beneficiary's interest may demand a termination if the mort-
gage absorbs all equity in the property, for then the beneficiary
has no interest to be protected.3 2
Ordinarily in English law a trust may not be terminated
where there are future interests yet unvested, but even here
there are exceptions. Thus a class entitled in the discretion of
a trustee may act together, though not individually, to terminate
the trust ;33 and one of several beneficiaries may terminate the
trust as to him if no one is injured by his action. Thus a trust
to apply income for a beneficiary's maintenance entitles the
beneficiary to the income absolutely, though, not having an in-
28. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 337 (939).
29. UNDERHILL, LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 444 (11th ed. 1959).
30. Id. at 448.
31. Id. at 450.
32. Id. at 449.
33. Id. at 445.
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terest in the remainder, he would not be entitled to modify the
trust in other respects.3 4 More significantly, under the recent
Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 3 5 the English have moved sub-
stantially in the direction of permitting a judicial modification
or variation of trusts in the interests of beneficiaries not sui
juris, and this whether their interests be direct or indirect,
vested or contingent.3 6 The act allows the court to approve of
any plan "varying or revoking all or any of the trusts or enlarg-
ing the powers of the trustee of managing or administering any
of the property subject to the trusts," submitted by co-benefi-
ciaries or any other persons, if it be to the incapable's advan-
tage.3 7 Today, therefore, even a trust in which an incapable is
a beneficiary may be modified or varied if it is to the benefit of
such a beneficiary to do so.
Thus it is that in the native home of the trust the benefi-
ciaries may in principle always terminate or modify it. Never-
theless the English permit of some devices in trusts which have
some of the obnoxious features of indestructible trusts and most
of those of spendthrift trusts. Thus the English, while insisting
that every absolutely vested interest be subject to the control of
its owner, have nevertheless tolerated gifts over in the event of
bankruptcy or the attempt to alienate and dispositions in which
the interests of a beneficiary are determined by the trustee in
his discretion.38 It seems to the writer that it is little consolation
to the beneficiary that he may not control his interest because
it is not vested absolutely, when the purpose for not giving it to
him absolutely is to deprive him of control. The one is as ob-
noxious as the other.
Why has American law generally, and Louisiana law in par-
ticular, permitted indestructible trusts and its dependent devices,
indestructible directions to accumulate income and spendthrift
trusts? And why has English law permitted some of the same
effects through other devices? The only persons pleased by such
devices are settlors and trustees. And yet, what is their claim
34. Id. at 452.
35. Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53. This legislation, the
general American law, and the very strict Louisiana law are compared in Camp,
The Variation of Trusts Act, 1958: A Departure from Traditional Principles of
Trust Law, 34 TUL. L. REv. 87 (1959).
36. Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1(1).
37. Camp, The Variation of Trusts Act, 1958: A Departure from Traditional
Principles of Trust Law, 34 TuL. L. Ray. 87 (1959).




of right? Certainly the trustee should have none. And should
settlors have a claim of right? It is no argument that the prop-
erty placed in trust is that which at the time of the creation of
the trust belongs to them. Property ceases to be that of a trans-
feror - or should - immediately upon his transfer of it to an-
other, whether absolutely or subject to a trust. Indeed, the most
vocal proponents of trusts insist that the trust property should
not be subject to the settlors' control after the creation of the
trust, so that the trust capital will not continue to be considered
theirs under the gift and estate tax laws.3 9 But does it not real-
ly remain theirs in part if their schemes for its administration,
investment, and employment - products of their wills - remain
fixed for long periods after they have divested themselves of any
personal benefit, even for long periods after their deaths? Very
obviously through such trusts the law has permitted individual
persons to be placed in partial and private economic dictator-
ships by other individual persons.
We in Louisiana, so long free of this insult through law to
human dignity, finally succumbed to it in increasing doses. The
very general trust legislation of 192040 was severely but insuffi-
ciently restricted by Article IV, Section 16, of the Constitution
of 1921. Under that section the trust could not last longer, as to
a natural person beneficiary, than ten years after the death of
the settlor unless that beneficiary were a minor at the time of
the creation of the trust; in that event the trust could last, as to
that person, until ten years after his majority. The maximum
duration period specified in the 1938 Trust Estates Act as orig-
inally enacted adhered to this limitation. 41 In 1952 the permis-
sible duration of the trust as to any natural person beneficiary
was increased to his death or ten years after that of the settlor,
whichever was the longer period.42 And in 1962 the law was
changed to the effect that the trust could last as to all benefi-
ciaries until the death of the last surviving income beneficiary,
or if the settlor specifically so provided, for ten years after the
settlor's death, whichever was the longer period.48 Similarly,
spendthrift trusts, or prohibitions against voluntary or involun-
39. The tax implications of the proposals made in this article are considered
briefly at page 660 infra.
40. La. Acts 1920, No. 107.
41. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 4, later designated as LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950).
42. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 208; LA. R.S.
9:1794 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 209.
. 43. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 521, does not
contain any limitation on the duration of trusts. L.A. R.S. 9:1794 (1950), as
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tary alienations by the beneficiary, originally were allowable
only as to the income, and not as to the principal, of a trust.
44
In 1944, however, the permissibility of such prohibitions was ex-
tended to cover the principal as well as the income interest of a
beneficiary. 45 There was no specific amendatory legislation on
accumulations, but with each extension of the duration of the
trust the evil of accumulations was extended.
Strangely, few voices have been raised against all this, either
in America generally or in Louisiana in particular. Perhaps it
is because beneficiaries do not have a lobby, but settlors and
professional trustees in effect do. Those who wish to project
their wills over their property - and over their transferees -
after they have given up beneficial interests in it of course want
"liberal" trust legislation. Attorneys' naturally want to satisfy
the desires of their clients, and in practice this means the desires
of would-be settlors and professional trustees, not of those who
become beneficiaries. Settlors tend to like, and professional
trustees stand to gain, from "liberal" trust legislation, legisla-
tion which will give the settlor the opportunity to do what he
wishes. Professional trustees, too, over the nation, have long
had well-organized advertising or "public relations" programs.
And there is no doubt most of these persons and entities are of
the utmost good faith, seeing only the good they do and failing
to notice the harm. The harm is, after all, mostly of a kind
which is not readily apparent: injury to personal dignity; lost
opportunities for self expression and development of the indi-
vidual beneficiary; and, as will be mentioned below, unwhole-
some economic effects.
There are murmurs against all this and, though they be few,
they shall probably increase. Thus in the February 1963 issue
of Trusts and Estates, one trust officer complained that bene-
ficiaries often suffered from unalterable schemes of settlors,
well intentioned though they might have been.4 And in Decem-
ber 1962, at the annual meeting of American law professors,
the subject of a round table on property law was the adverse
economic effect of the control of property by persons without
amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 74, prescribes the limits given in the body of the
article.
44. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 28, now LA. R.S. 9:1923 (1950).
45. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 28, as amended, La. Acts 1944, No. 290, now LA.
R.S. 9:1923 (1950).




beneficial interest, and much of the discussion was related to
or applied to express private trusts as well as to other forms of
trusts. 47 Certainly it does not take a trained economist to under-
stand that an extensive use of trusts will shift much capital to
investments in Grade A common stocks and away from invest-
ments in smaller enterprises and consumer spending. One pos-
sible effect which Louisiana should consider is that much capital
will be placed in investments which will produce most of their
economic good outside this state. Unfortunately, the writer
knows of no studies which might supply accurate data on such
economic conditions and effects attributable to private trusts.
It would be well, therefore, for those revising our trust legis-
lation to solicit not only the aid of lawyers, but also that of
moralists (philosophers and theologians), economists, and so-
ciologists, before deciding on the proper content of a Trust Es-
tates Law for Louisiana. Legal experts must be relied upon to
supply advice regarding the form of the trust legislation once a
decision is made as to its proper content or substance; and
whereas legal experts no doubt will be able to offer much even
as to the substance of the law, they are not, by reason of legal
training at least, equipped to do the whole job.
II. THE TECHNICAL FORMULATION OF THE TRUST
In the terms of its historical derivation, the Anglo-American
private trust is an institution in which the owner at law of prop-
erty is obliged in equity to deal with it for the benefit of another.
The almost complete disappearance of separate courts of law and
equity leads to the rephrasing of that definition to read that the
trust is an institution in which one with legal title to property is
obliged equitably (or in accordance with the principles developed
in equity) to deal with it for the benefit of another. There is no
reason to quarrel with this historically oriented definition, even
though the trustee's "legal title" in Anglo-American law now
means nothing more than that he is a person endowed with
well-defined duties and powers to deal with the trust property
for the benefit of another. The trustee has no rights, only duties
47. Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Chicago,
Illinois, December 28-30, 1962. Round Table on Economic Power and Property.
Professor James F. Hogg of the University of Minnesota Law School, then visit-
ing at the Columbia Law School, spoke on "The Independence of Trustees from
Beneficiaries." The Rev. Paul P. Harbrecht, S.J., of the University of Detroit
Law School and Consultant to the Twentieth Century Fund, spoke on "Trustee
and Other Non-Beneficial Ownership of Productive Capacity."
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toward others. Over the centuries the trustee's "legal title" has
been transformed from an ownership at law (which itself gave
him the powers which equity required him to use for another
rather than for himself) to a fiduciary capacity with obliga-
tions and responsibilities. The Anglo-American lawyer now reads
"fiduciary" where his forebears read "legal owner" or "owner
at law," and he is not confused.
The English comparatist Lawson, for example, in his Intro-
duction to the [English] Law of Property, recognizes all this in
very clear language:
"Fragmentation [of ownership] takes place in several
different ways ... through the operation of tenure between
landlord and tenant, by co-ownership, by a peculiar way of
looking at rights to successive enjoyment, by the creation of
rent charges, by the detachment of powers of alienation or
appointment from enjoyment, and by the use of trusts as a
means of divorcing the management from the enjoyment of
property." 48 (Emphasis added.)
"If property is given to trustees to hold in trust for bene-
ficiaries the trustees are said, now mainly for historical
reasons, to have the legal estate, and the beneficiaries the
equitable interest. The former is merely a way of explaining
that the trustees are the managers of the property and can
act commercially as owners of it, enjoying wide powers of
alienating it in the market; while the latter means that the
beneficiaries have the beneficial ownership, which implies
that they can enjoy the use and possession of it and draw an
income from it.''49 (Emphasis added.)
Again,
"[T]here must be some personal relation between the
manager and the beneficiary, under which the former may
be made liable to the latter if he wrongfully mismanages the
property. That relation is in English law called a trust. The
manager is trustee for the beneficiary. But the question still
remains, what are the relations of trustee and beneficiary to
the thing held in trust? It would have been possible to say
either that the trustee owns the property but is under a duty
48. LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 9 (1958).
49. Id. at 10.
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to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiary, who has
nothing more than a correlative personal right against the
trustee, or on the contrary that the beneficiary owns the
property but gives full powers of management to the trustee,
who stands in no direct relation to the property but acts
merely by delegation of property rights vested in the bene-
ficiary. English law has taken neither course, but has in ef-
fect said that both trustee and beneficiary own the property
in different ways, or, more accurately, that neither owns the
property in the strict Roman sense of the term ownership,
but each owns a different interest in it, called respectively
the legal estate and the equitable interest. It says that to
ask in such a situation who owns the physical object is an
improper question, just as it would be improper to ask
whether a tenant for life or a person entitled to the land
after his death owned the land itself."50 (Emphasis added.)
Thus English legal science recognizes the difference between
the substantive nature of the trust and its historical and tech-
nical formulation or definition. At the same time it recognizes
that there is no need to depart from that formula in English
law, and what is said of English law may equally well be said
of American law. But justification and excuse for the retention
of that formula for the trust in Anglo-American jurisdictions is
not of itself justification for its use in Louisiana law. Thus the
question is whether the new trust legislation should retain that
formula. Admittedly several arguments for its retention might
be made. It is already in our law, and it has been in our law at
least since 1938. The Anglo-American literature which Louisi-
ana lawyers no doubt will use reflects this concept of the trust.
Anglo-American lawyers would be able to understand our trust
law more easily if it were written in terms already familiar to
them. Conflict-of-laws trust problems might be minimized. Each
of these arguments has some merit in fact, but the writer sub-
mits that it would be both possible and wiser to avoid the Anglo-
American trust formula.
It is not difficult to define the trust in functional rather than
traditional Anglo-American terms."' If the trustee is only a
fiduciary, why not simply say so? In the private trust it is the
beneficiaries who have the real present and future interests in
50. Id. at 77.
51. Ample support of this is to be found in the writer's previous articles which
are referred to in the note at the beginning of this article, identifying the writer.
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the property in trust. Why not recognize them as owners of the
present and future interests in the property subject to the
trustee's administration, management, and control under the
terms of the trust?
The absence in our law of separate divisions known as law
and equity is sufficient reason to avoid the Anglo-American
trust formula. Louisiana legal science should be knowledgable
enough, and brave enough, to do it. Our "laboratory of compara-
tive law" can continue to be an object of pride only if it is pro-
ductive. It is not a work of legal science to import an institu-
tion into our law in such a form that its components cannot be
absorbed into the existing legal structure. But admittedly this
is a plea largely for the sake of our as yet justifiable pride as
bi-cultural jurists. Probably we could get along with the Anglo-
American definition of trusts, but we would sacrifice our right
to consider ourselves astute in legal technology. We would, too,
miss an opportunity to offer an example to other civil law juris-
dictions who as yet have difficulties introducing the trust in such
a form as to avail themselves of its beneficial uses without sac-
rificing the coherence of their legal systems.
Beyond the interest of legal science, or legal technology, there
is also the practical interest in facilitating the understanding of
the trust by our own practitioners and judges. Admittedly we
will be able to get along with the Anglo-American definition, but
getting along is not the same as living well. Admittedly, too,
the greatest difficulty which Louisiana lawyers have had with
the Anglo-American trust definition has been in connection with
our former constitutional prohibitions against fidei commissa
and substitutions. 52 Some members of the bench and bar were
inclined to think of any trust as a fideicommissary substitution
because the trustee was given "title" (which they mistakenly
equated with "ownership") subject to the obligation to transfer
the property to another at the end of the trust.53 Since 1962
substitutions may be contained in trusts to the extent authorized
by the legislature, 54 and hence no longer can a trust permissible
under the legislation be objectionable because it is thought,
rightly or wrongly, to contain a fideicommissary substitution.
52. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
53. See Succession of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957) and Succes-
sion of Meadors, 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), both of which are suf-
ficiently discussed in the Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 889 (1962).
54. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 521.
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But rendering a situation lawful does not in itself insure under-
standing of the nature of that situation, and in the future there
may arise further instances of confusion not connected with
fideicommissary substitutions. Some Louisiana lawyers, too,
find it preferable to avoid the Anglo-American formula in cre-
ating trusts and transfer property to one person subject to a
trust of which a certain person is named trustee. This practice,
after all, not only is more realistic, but makes the trust more
understandable to both the civilian-oriented lawyers and their
laymen clients. And this in itself is a factor not to be ignored,
for many Louisiana lawyers admit to being baffled by the Anglo-
American concept. Perhaps this in itself is a reason why the
trust has not been used more widely in Louisiana.
III. A WORD ABOUT TAXATION
What would be the tax consequences of a trust estates law
based on the principles espoused in this article? First, neither
defining the trust in functional rather than traditional Anglo-
American terms, nor giving the beneficiaries the power to termi-
nate it, would deprive the settlor of estate tax savings presently
achievable through trusts. Those savings would be lost, then as
now, only when the settlor retained control of the trust or of the
property placed in trust.5 5 Secondly, defining the trust in func-
tional terms compatible with our property law would not of it-
self result in the income from the trust being taxed to the bene-
ficiaries. Not "legal title," but economic power, or substantial
control, is the principle according to which the tax laws and
regulations are written, interpreted, and applied.5 A trust in-
destructible by the beneficiaries, therefore, though defined in
functional terms, would produce the same tax consequences as
one defined in Anglo-American terms.
But what of the trust, whether defined in functional or
Anglo-American terms, which might be terminated, or the in-
come therefrom demanded, by the beneficiaries? Here, appar-
55. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038(a) (1).
56. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 154, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 160, which emphasizes
that not, legal title under local law, but control, determines the taxable entity.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 itself clearly implies this principle in
§ 678, diacussed hereafter in the text, when it taxes the beneficiaries of an Anglo-
American trust if they in fact have control over the property or its income, and
also in §§ 671-677, in which the settlor is taxed if he retains control over the trust
or the property subject to it.
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ently, it is necessary to take Secton 678 of the Internal Revenue
Code into account. That section reads in part:
"(a) General rule. A person other than the grantor shall
be treated as the owner of any portions of a trust with re-
spect to which:
"(1) such person has a power exercisable solely by him-
self to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in him-
self .... ,,57
Inasmuch as the principles espoused in this article would lead to
a rule permitting each ascertained income or usufruct benefi-
ciary to demand his share of the trust income even if the settlor
has stipulated it should be accumulated, the income from all
trusts would, in the writer's opinion, be taxed to the benefi-
ciaries. Thus the income tax savings presently available to bene-
ficiaries"8 of indestructible trusts would disappear. But this,
after all, is exactly as it should be. No one with the same income
in fact as another should be permitted to enjoy preferential tax
treatment. 5"
57. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 678. Under another provision of the Internal
Revenue Code, § 622, trust income is not taxable to the beneficiary unless "paid,
credited, or required to be distributed" and "whether distributed or not." In the
light of § 678, however, this provision must not be available to the beneficiary
who can terminate the trust or demand the accumulated income.
58. One income tax advantage, nevertheless, would result from the creation of
a trust even though the beneficiaries could terminate it or demand the income.
By shifting revenue-producing property from the settlor's patrimony to that of
another, the combined income taxes of the settlor on his remaining income and
of the beneficiary on his income might be less than that which would otherwise
be payable by the settlor. This facet of the income tax laws, like the estate tax
laws, encourages the distribution of wealth.
59. Indeed, present tax laws permit the separate taxation of the income from
a trust not distributed, credited, or required to be distributed to a beneficiary
precisely because such a beneficiary does not in fact enjoy the benefits of his
alleged right to it. But this well-intentioned rule encourages those who would
effect tax savings to create indestructible trusts with directions to accumulate
income, and thus to deprive their beneficiaries of fundamental human rights.
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